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NEW AGE COMSTOCKERY
Robert Corn-Revere*
The term "Comstockery," coined by George Ber-
nard Shaw, refers to the overzealous moralizing like
that of Anthony Comstock, whose Society for the
Suppression of Vice censored literature in America
for more than sixty years. Under the "Comstock
law," classic works by such authors as D.H. Law-
rence, Theodore Dreiser, Edmund Wilson and
James Joyce were routinely suppressed. Other
targets of the Society's crusades included such liter-
ary giants as Tolstoy and Balzac. The more current
law of indecency, which traces its heritage to Corn-
stock, has been used to restrict some of the same lit-
erary works. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
extends this repressive regime to the Internet and
online services, and thus threatens to undermine the
promise of the emerging Digital Age.'
Although popularly described as a deregulation
measure, the Telecommunications Act imposes
sweeping new content regulations on electronic me-
dia. In a portion of the Act known as the Communi-
cations Decency Act, Sections 502 and 507, imple-
ment new restrictions on the transmission of obscene
or indecent communication by computer or online
services. Section 502 prohibits the use of any interac-
tive computer service to "display in a manner availa-
ble to a person under 18 years of age" any indecent
information "whether or not the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the communication." The
new law also makes it a crime for any person to
"knowingly permit[ ]" a computer system under his
control to transmit indecent information. Violators of
the section may be fined up to $250,000 or impris-
oned for two years, or both.
The law recognizes a number of exemptions and
defenses to prosecution. Section 501(e) exempts the
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following activities from liability: (1) simply provid-
ing access or a connection to a computer system not
under the control of the access provider, and other
related activities, such as intermediate storage, access
software, or other related capabilities, but not in-
cluding "the creation of content of the communica-
tion;" (2) employment of a person who provides pro-
hibited access, unless the employer has knowledge of,
or ratifies the conduct. The subsection denies statu-
tory exemptions for a "conspirator" with any entity
"actively involved in the creation or knowing distri-
bution" of indecent communications, or of anyone
"who knowingly advertises the availability of such
communications." It also denies an exemption to ac-
cess providers that are "owned or operated" by enti-
ties that make indecent information available.
Section 502(e) also provides a defense for entities
that take "reasonable, effective, and appropriate ac-
tions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
access by minors" including "any method which is
feasible under available technology," and for entities
that block access until the customer uses a credit
card, debit account, adult access code or adult per-
sonal identification number.'
Section 502(0(2) preempts state or local regula-
tions that would impose liability on "commercial en-
tities, nonprofit libraries, or institutions of higher ed-
ucation" in a way that is "inconsistent with the
treatment of those activities or actions under this sec-
tion." However, nothing in the law precludes local
governments from "enacting and enforcing comple-
mentary oversight, liability, and regulatory systems,
procedures, and requirements" over intrastate com-
munications that do not impose inconsistent obliga-
tions on interstate services."
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a The FCC is empowered to "describe" measures it believes
to be "reasonable, effective, and appropriate" to block minors'
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measures." Id. § 502(e)(6).
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Section 502 grew out of a bill originally proposed
by Senator James Exon of Nebraska which the Sen-
ate overwhelmingly approved last June.8 The bill
was intended to outlaw the use of computers and
telephone lines to transmit "indecent" material, a
category of speech that the Supreme Court has held
to be protected by the First Amendment but subject
to certain types of regulation. The House bill con-
tained no similar measure. Instead, by a vote of 420-
4, the House adopted Congressmen Cox and
Wyden's "Internet Freedom and Family Empower-
ment Act."'
The Cox/Wyden bill was offered as an alternative
to the Exon amendment, and- was designed to pro-
mote development of interactive computer services,
rather than to treat them as a threat. In particular, it
provided that "[nlothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to grant any jurisdiction or authority to the
[Federal Communications] Commission with respect
to economic or content regulation of the Internet or
other interactive computer services." 8 Also, it made
clear that an on-line provider could be penalized for
''any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to [obscene, lewd, excessively violent or
harassing] material." 9 Although the House over-
whelmingly adopted the Cox/Wyden bill, a man-
ager's amendment to the House Telecommunications
Bill included language that would provide criminal
penalties for the intentional communication "by
computer" of indecent material to minors.10
The discrepancy between the House and Senate
provisions were resolved in Conference, with signifi-
cant lobbying from many sides. A coalition of online
service providers, common carriers and computer
companies supported a compromise bill sponsored by
Congressman Rick White, based primarily on the
Cox/Wyden amendment, but allowing for more
targeted criminal penalties based on the more speech
protective "harmful to minors" standard. 1 The
Christian Coalition and other "anti-porn" groups,
on the other hand, pressed for more broad law en-
forcement authority for "indecent" transmissions.1 2
The Committee, in December, 1995, voted 17 to
dards govern the regulation of indecency. It does not affect the
recent Sixth Circuit holding that local community standards gov-
ern obscenity prosecutions in the online context. See United
States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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" Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, § 2(d),
16 to adopt an "indecency" standard for online com-
munications instead of the less censorial "harmful to
minors" standard proposed by Congressman
White." After the vote, the Christian Coalition and
others opposed a clarification recommended by
Speaker Newt Gingrich to state that the legislation
does not outlaw transmission of serious works of
literature, art, science, and politics.' The same orga-
nizations opposed an exemption from the legislation
for non-profit libraries and schools."
The Cox/Wyden bill was retained in the final
Telecommunications Act, but only as a limitation on
civil liability. That is, under Section 509 of the Act,
online services and access, providers are shielded
from civil liability for "any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected." The pro-
vision that prohibited FCC content regulation of the
Internet was dropped from the final law. As
adopted, the Act makes clear that "[n]othing in [Sec-
tion 509] shall be construed to impair the enforce-
ment of" the online indecency prohibition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Deja Vu All Over Again
The events that led to the passage of the Commu-
nications Decency Act have a very familiar ring. In
1864, an alarmed Postmaster General reported that
"great numbers" of dirty pictures and books were
being mailed to Civil War troops. It seems that one
of the most popular early uses of photography was
the tintype version of the pinup.
As is often the case, invention became the mother
of repression. Congress reacted quickly to the Post-
master's report, passing a law in 1865 making it a
crime to send any "obscene book, pamphlet, picture,
print, or other publication of vulgar and indecent
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 30, 1995).
Id. § 2(c).
10 141 Cong. Rec H8450 (Aug. 4, 1995).
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1996, at 8.
12 Id.
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character" through the U.S. mail.16
This law was strengthened several years later at
the insistence of Anthony Comstock, a former dry
goods clerk, who exerted broad influence in his new
role as the Secretary of the New York Society for the
Suppression of Vice.17 Under the popularly named
"Comstock law," thousands of authors were jailed
and literally tons of literature destroyed."
Fast forward to 1995, the new age of Comstock-
ery. Retiring Senator James Exon of Nebraska in-
troduced the Communications Decency Act in Feb-
ruary, 1995" because he was concerned that the
information superhighway was in danger of becom-
ing an electronic "red light district."20 Exon was also
troubled about the law's ability to keep pace with
new technology. "Before too long," Exon told his
Senate colleagues,
a host of new telecommunications devices will be used by
citizens to communicate with each other. Telephones may
one day be relegated to museums next to telegraphs. Con-
versation is being replaced with communication and elec-
trical transmissions are being replaced with digital trans-
missions ... Anticipating this exciting future of
communications, the Communications Decency amend-
ment ... will keep pace with the coming change."
Or, as he put it in doublespeak: "The information
superhighway is . . . a revolution that in years to
come will transcend newspapers, radio, and televi-
sion as an information source. Therefore, I think this
is the time to put some restrictions or guidelines on
it.",
22
Far from moving communications into the future,
the Communications Decency Act returns the First
Amendment to those less than thrilling days of yes-
teryear, when publishers routinely checked with the
censors in advance to determine whether a particular
manuscript was acceptable.2 8 The law threatens to
lobotomize the Internet by superimposing essentially
the same legal standard that stifled the publication of
literature in America for nearly 60 years under the
Comstock laws.
To understand the effect of the law, it is necessary
to consider the difference between modern obscenity
10 Post Office Act, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507 (1865).
'7 EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE
4 (1992).
1 I Id.
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21 Id.
2' Peter H. Lewis, Cybersex Stays Hot, Despite a Plan for
Cooling it Off, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, (Abstracts) at 1.
law, under which the First Amendment protects all
but the most hard-core material, and obscenity law
during Comstock's heyday, which outlawed any ma-
terial that a jury believed might offend the sensibili-
ties of the most vulnerable segments of society. In
addition, it is important to examine the more recent
doctrine of "indecency," which has been employed to
limit exposure by children to offensive sexual mater-
ials on radio and television.
B. The Comstock Law
In 1873, the year he was named Secretary of the
New York Society for the Suppression of Vice,
Anthony Comstock came to Washington to lobby for
stronger obscenity laws.' In doing so, he quite effec-
tively employed a tactic that Jesse Helms and James
Exon would emulate over a century later: Comstock
brought along a great cloth bag filled with examples
of "lowbrow" publications as well as information on
contraception and abortion. He set up in the Vice
President's office what came to be known as a
"chamber of horrors" to display materials he be-
lieved should not be available to the public.
25
Comstock's persistence paid off. Congress adopted
the proposed law to Suppress Trade in, and Circula-
tion of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral
Use." In addition to obscene books, prints or other
publications "of an indecent character," the law also
prohibited the mailing of "any article or thing
designed or intended for the prevention of conception
or procuring of abortion. '27 Moreover, Comstock
was named a special unpaid agent of the Post Office
Department and empowered to enforce the law."8
This authorized Comstock to inspect mail that he
suspected might be obscene at any post office across
the country.
Like Senator Exon's Amendment, which was in-
spired by a desire to protect his granddaughter, the
Comstock law-indeed, all obscenity law of the pe-
riod-was predicated on a need to protect the most
impressionable members of the population. 2 ' The
relevant legal standard was drawn from an English
" See generally DE GRAZIA, supra note 17.
2 Id. at 4.
'a Id.
An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation
of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use, ch. 258, 17
Stat. 598-99 (1873) [hereinafter Comstock Act].
27 Id.




case, Regina v. Hicklin,80 which held that the test
for obscenity turned on whether the material tended
to corrupt the morals of a young or immature
person.81
The courts were concerned with "those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."8 2
Consequently, the intended audience of a book was
unimportant so long as a young and inexperienced
person might be exposed to its corrupting influence.
Additionally, it was immaterial whether the book as
a whole possessed literary merit."3 The courts fo-
cused instead on the passages they found to be most
offensive to determine if a book was obscene. Indeed,
some found that literary merit compounded the
crime, by "enhancing a book's capacity to deprave
and corrupt.'4
The crusades against literature were motivated
largely by the belief that certain novels would in-
flame the passions of young women whose virtue
would soon be lost, but this was not the only con-
cern. Comstock also crusaded against "dime novels"
with their sensational tales of big city detectives and
wild west gunslingers.8" These inexpensive books,
filled with accounts of crime and violence were de-
nounced as "the inspiration for all of the antisocial
behavior exhibited by the youth of the day." Coin-
stock called such books "devil-traps for the young."8"
Once given the authority, Comstock wasted no
time in cracking down on what he called "vampire
literature."8 In the first six months of the Comstock
law, he claimed to have seized 194,000 obscene pic-
tures and photographs, 14,200 stereopticon plates
and 134,000 pounds of books, among other things.3 8
He zealously pursued this mission for another forty-
one years.3 9 Near the end of his life, Comstock wrote
that he convicted "enough people to fill a passenger
train of sixty-one coaches, with sixty of the coaches
containing sixty people each and the last one almost
full.' 0 He said that he had destroyed almost 160
tons of obscene literature and 3,984,063 obscene pic-
80 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
81 Id. at 371.
" Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor:
Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Soci-
ety-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 741, 757 (1992).
ss Id.
DE GRAZIA, supra note 17, at 12.
s! Blanchard, supra note 32, at 757; Mary Noel, Dime
Novels, AM. HERITAGE, Feb. 1956, at 50-55, 112-13.
8s Id.
37 DE GRAZIA, supra note 17, at 5.
88 Id. at 4.
tures." Comstock also zealously pursued early femi-
nists, such as Margaret Sanger, since his law prohib-
ited the mailing of information on contraception and
abortion.'
After Comstock died, his work was carried on by
John Sumner, who took his place as Secretary of the
Society for the Suppression of Vice. But Sumner,
like Comstock before him, did not have to rely on
convictions as the sole measure of success. He could
often persuade a publisher not to print a particular
book, or, if already published, to recall all copies,
turn them over for destruction and melt down the
plates. 48 By this method, Sumner pressured top New
York publishers to withdraw from circulation and
destroy all outstanding copies of Women in Love, by
D.H. Lawrence, The Genius, by Theodore Dreiser,
and Memoirs of Hecate County, by Edmund Wil-
son."" Comstock even attacked George Bernard
Shaw's play, Mrs. Warren's Profession, because it
dealt with prostitution. 4' Despite - or perhaps be-
cause of - the notoriety, the play enjoyed great suc-
cess, and Shaw extracted further revenge by coining
the term "Comstockery.""
No case better illustrated the excesses of Com-
stockery (or the problems with the current law of
"indecency") than the campaign to censor James
Joyce's Ulysses. The first obscenity prosecution of
the classic work occurred when installments from the
book were published in a literary magazine named
The Little Review. The publishers were arrested
and prosecuted in 1920 because of the book's sexual
themes. They were convicted and fined five hundred
dollars. 4 But the real loss was beyond the court-
room; no single American publisher would even con-
sider printing the book for the next eleven years.48
This embargo ended in 1932, when an upstart
publishing company, Random House, decided to
make Ulysses a test case. Random House contracted
with Joyce to publish Ulysses in America, and sued
in federal court over the seizure by U.S. Customs of-
ficials of a French version of the book.' 9 The court
89 Id.
40 Blanchard, supra note 32, at 758.
41 Id.; DE GRAZIA, supra note 17, at 5; C. G. TRUMBULL,
ANTHONY COMSTOCK, FIGHTER 239 (1913).
' Comstock Act, supra note 26.
4s DE GRAZIA, supra note 17, at 710.
Id. at 72-73, 710.
4 Blanchard, supra note 32, at 758.
4e Id.
47 DE GRAZIA, supra note 17.
48 Id. at 17.




held that the book was not obscene, and in doing so,
rejected the prevailing legal test.50 In a decision af-
firmed on appeal, the court found that the book must
be judged as a whole, and not by the effect that se-
lected passages might have on vulnerable
populations.5
The court of appeals said it "cannot be gainsaid"
that "numerous long passages in Ulysses contain
matter [which] is obscene under any fair definition of
the word." 2 The court found that the troublesome
portions of the book "are introduced to give meaning
to the whole, rather than to promote lust or portray
filth for its own sake."" The court concluded:
We do not think that Ulysses, taken as a whole tends to
promote lust, and its criticized passages do this no more
than scores of standard books that are constantly bought
and sold. Indeed, a book of physiology in the hands of
adolescents may be more objectional on this ground than
almost anything else."
The Ulysses case signaled the end of the Hicklin
rule in America. As a result, the obscenity of a work
of literature was determined not by the sensibilities
of the most tender reader, but by those of the average
reader. And the work was considered as a whole, not
just by reference to the most lurid passages. Never-
theless, many publishers continued to shy away from
certain books. For example, Lady Chatterly's Lover,
written in 1928, was not published in its unexpur-
gated form in America until 1959."' Henry Miller's
Tropic of Cancer, written in 1934, was not pub-
lished in the United States until 1960.56 However,
this restrictiveness faded as the courts began to con-
sider the First Amendment implications of obscenity
convictions.
II. MODERN OBSCENITY LAW
A. The Supreme Court Defines Obscenity
Since 1957, the Supreme Court has held consist-
ently that the First Amendment does protect obscene
speech.5" But before it confines otherwise protected
50 Id. at 184.
81 United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705,
706 (2d Cir. 1934).
82 Id. at 706-07.
8 Id. at 707.
84 Id. at 707-08.
5 DE GRAZIA, supra note 17, at 94. See also Grove Press,
Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
. DE GRAZIA, supra note 17, at 55, 370.
57 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
expression to constitutional purgatory, the Court has
stressed that the government cannot punish speech if
it has even minimal value, and that rigorous due
process protections must be applied. In Roth v.
United States," the Court emphasized that "[aill
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social im-
portance unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion
have the full protection of the [First Amendment]
guarantees."" Sixteen years later, in Miller v. Cali-
fornia,60 the Court reformulated the test to state that
obscenity "must be limited to works which, taken as
a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,
and which . . . do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.".61
A major adjustment in the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to obscenity in the Miller case was its reli-
ance on local community standards to determine
which portrayals of sexual conduct "appeal to the
prurient interest in sex" and consequently are "pa-
tently offensive." '62 In the years between Roth and
Miller, the Court had become the final arbiter of
what material was obscene, and the Justices evi-
dently grew tired of it. The Court had found it nec-
essary on thirty-one occasions to review the purport-
edly obscene material and render a judgment.68
Justice Brennan complained that examination of
the contested materials "is hardly a source of edifica-
tion to the members of this Court." '64 Apart from his
personal reactions to the works, Brennan added that
the procedure of having the Court examine the
materials "has cast us in the role of an unreviewable
board of censorship for the 50 states."65 After sixteen
years of trying to apply the law, Justice Brennan,
who wrote the Roth opinion, concluded that the gov-
ernment could not constitutionally prohibit
obscenity.66
A majority of the Court agreed with Justice Bren-
nan's reasoning but not his conclusion. Reviewing
the "somewhat tortured history of the Court's ob-
scenity decisions," 67 it found that "[p]eople in differ-
ent States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this
8 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
88 Id. at 484.
60 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
01 Id. at 24.
68 Id.
68 Id. at 23 n.3.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 92-93.
60 Id. at 73.
'7 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
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diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity."68 As a result, there cannot be
"fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what
appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offen-
sive.' "69 Chief Justice Burger emphasized that "our
nation is simply too big and too diverse for this
Court to reasonably expect that such standards could
be articulated for all 50 states in a single formula-
tion, assuming the prerequisite consensus exists."1
70
The Court noted that the First Amendment does
not require "that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas or New York City." 7 ' The Court also ac-
knowledged the converse proposition that community
reactions to literature in, say, rural Georgia or Ten-
nessee, should not dictate what is acceptable in ur-
ban centers.7 1 Indeed, Justice Stewart, famous for
his statement that he could not intelligibly define ob-
scenity but "I know it when I see it," long main-
tained that a national standard could not be legally
created or applied."3 Based on this reasoning, the
Court in Miller concluded that the question of "pat-
ent offensiveness" was a matter for juries to decide,
applying local community standards.
7 4
From the Court's perspective, this solution had the
twin merits of avoiding a national standard for ob-
scenity while at the same time freeing the Justices
from their uncomfortable role as critics of last resort.
But it created the risk that the test for serious liter-
ary, artistic, political or social value would be set by
the most reactionary community. Accordingly, the
Court later clarified that the question of serious re-
deeming merit did not hinge on the vagaries of local
literary tastes. Whether a work contains serious
value must be judged by reference to the hypothetical
reasonable person - not the reasonable resident of the
community in question. As a result, before a work
may be condemned as obscene, the government must
demonstrate that it lacks serious merit, and must do
so using an objective test.
7 5
While the prevailing concern of modern obscenity
law is the effect of the material on the average per-
son rather than the most sensitive, the law does rec-
68 Id. at 33.
61 Id. at 30.
71 Id. at 20, 30-33.
71 Id. at 32.
", Id. at 32-33, n.13.
71 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 200 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
74 Miller, 413 U.S. at 31-32.
7* Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
76 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
ognize some added protections for children. The Su-
preme Court has held that the government may
designate some sexually oriented material as being
harmful to minors and to, for example, prohibit the
sale of such things as "girlie magazines" to those six-
teen and under.76 But such restrictions must be care-
fully limited. The Supreme Court has held that it
will not tolerate vague, open-ended restrictions on
speech not even for the benefit of minors and that the
government cannot "reduce the adult population...
to reading only what is fit for children.
'7
B. The Paradox of Indecency
The Communications Decency Act prohibits not
just obscenity online, but indecency as well.78 For
the past twenty-five years or so, the federal govern-
ment has stepped up its efforts to define and enforce
provisions of the United States Criminal Code that
prohibit the transmission of "indecent" language by
radio, television or telephone communications. 9 Un-
like obscenity, the Supreme Court and Courts of Ap-
peals have held that indecent speech is protected by
the First Amendment." But, because indecency deals
with sexual matters, courts also have held that the
government may regulate it in certain
circumstances.8 '
The law regulating indecency is best known as a
result of the George Carlin monologue, Filthy
Words, which he described as the "words you
couldn't say on the public airwaves. "2 The seven
words were those which Carlin said "will curve your
spine, grow hair on your hands and maybe, even
bring us, God help us, peace without honor.".83 The
Carlin routine was broadcast by Pacifica radio dur-
ing a program about society's attitude toward lan-
guage. Before the show the station had issued a
warning that the program contained "sensitive lan-
guage which might be regarded as offensive to
some."
8'
The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") received a single com-
plaint about the Pacifica program, which the Su-
"' Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957); see also
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Interstate Cir-
cuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
7' Telecomm Act, supra note 2, § 508.
79 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994).
80 E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
81 Id. at 732.
", Id. at 751 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
Id.
I d. at 730.
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preme Court characterized as coming from "a father
who heard the broadcast while driving with his
young son." 8 In fact, the complaint came from a
Comstock wannabe, John R. Douglas, a member of
the national planning board for Morality in Media,
who did not disclose his fifteen-year-old son's age to
the FCC.86 The broadcast aired at 2 p.m. on a
school day, and there is considerable doubt whether
the concerned father or his "young son" actually was
in the audience. The complaint did not reach the
Commission until six weeks after the fact."'
The FCC found that the program violated the in-
decency rules, and the case made its way to the Su-
preme Court." Limiting its holding to the question
of whether the FCC "has the authority to proscribe
this particular broadcast,"" the Court upheld the
Commission's censure of the Pacifica station. It
held that broadcasters historically have received less
constitutional protection than the traditional press,
and that "the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Ameri-
cans."91 As the medium is "uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read" and the
broadcast audience "is constantly tuning in and out,"
the station's prior warnings could not protect the
public.92
The Court also approved the FCC's legal defini-
tion of indecency, which focused on "the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excre-
tory activities and organs at times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience."9 The Court did not directly confront the
question of literary merit, and it did not ascribe any
significance to the fact that the Carlin monologue
was part of a larger program that was a serious
study of language.94
The decision was not entirely coherent on the
05 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 186 (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1987).
06 Letter from John R. Douglas, National Planning Board
Member, Morality in Media, to the Commission (Dec. 3, 1973).
67 POWE, supra note 85.
88 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
8 Id. at 742.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 748.
2 Id. at 749.
I8 d. at 731.
I d. at 732.
9' Id. at 732 n.5.
96 Id. at 741 n.16.
question of redeeming social value as a defense to an
indecency complaint. The Court cited, seemingly
with approval, an FCC suggestion that "an offensive
broadcast [that] had literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value [that was] preceded by warnings . . .
might not be indecent in the late evening, but would
be so during the day, when children are in the audi-
ence." 95 It also referred to a 1960 FCC pronounce-
ment indicating that the words or depictions of sex-
ual activity in Lady Chatterly's Lover would raise
indecency questions if broadcast on radio or televi-
sion.96 But, at the same time, the Court emphasized
"the narrowness of [its] holding," stressing that the
case "does not involve . . . a telecast of an Elizabe-
than comedy."' 7
Since the late 1980's, the FCC has been engaged
in continuous litigation to clarify the basic require-
ments of its indecency policy. 98 In 1992, Congress
decreed that indecency would be banned from the
airwaves between 6 a.m. and midnight.99 The D.C.
Circuit recently affirmed the FCC's broadcast inde-
cency rules adopted pursuant to the statute, but nar-
rowed the restricted period from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.' 00
The court confirmed that such rules must balance
the government's interest in protecting children with
"the adult population's right to see and hear inde-
cent material" while tailoring its conclusions to the
unique attributes of the broadcast medium. 1'
Congress also applied indecency law to other elec-
tronic technologies, although the comparison to
broadcasting has been far from exact. For example,
in 1988 Congress amended the Communications Act
to combat the phenomenon of "dial-a-porn."102 The
change imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent as
well as obscene telephone messages. But upon review
by the Supreme Court, all nine Justices agreed that
sexual expression that is "indecent but not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment."'0 3 The Court
held that the government may regulate indecent
o Id. at 750.
• Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170,
181 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, en banc, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504,
1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
" Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-356, 106 Stat. 949 (1992); see also 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
For broadcasters who ended their broadcast day at or before
midnight, the prohibition extended from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. Id.
100 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
101 Id. at 665.
102 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994).
108 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
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speech to protect children, but "it must do so by nar-
rowly drawn regulations ...without unnecessarily
interfering with First Amendment freedoms. ' 10 4 The
opinion described Pacifica as "an emphatically nar-
row holding," and distinguished the radio broadcast
in that case from the telephone communications cov-
ered by the law. Unlike radio, the Court found that
dial-it services require the audience to take affirma-
tive steps to receive the indecent messages and that
"callers will generally not be unwilling listeners." It
concluded that telephone communications are "sub-
stantially different" from over-the-air broadcasts. 1 "5
These efforts over the years underscore the central
paradox of indecency law. Unlike obscenity, indecent
speech is protected by the First Amendment, yet it is
subject to a legal standard very similar to what the
courts rejected for obscenity more than six decades
ago.' 06 That is, indecency doctrine borrows from the
discredited Hicklin rule, focusing solely on the effect
of speech on children, not the average audience
member. And there is no requirement for the gov-
ernment to evaluate works "as a whole."' 0 In decid-
ing indecency complaints, the FCC focuses primarily
on the salacious portions of programs, and provides
only cursory review of the full context.'0 8
In practice, context is not all that important to the
nebulous world of indecency law. Although serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value of a work
is a complete defense to an obscenity prosecution,
merit is simply a factor for the regulatory body to
consider in the case of indecency. In an obscenity
trial, expert witnesses can attest to the value of the
material at issue. Conversely, when the FCC consid-
ers indecency complaints, it is for that agency alone
to determine the extent to which merit is relevant.
The FCC's official position is that the context in
which words or images are presented must be ex-
amined to determine whether the expression is "pa-
tently offensive."' 09 In practice, the FCC typically
ducks the question of context in such cases.
This was most forcefully demonstrated by the
115, 126 (1989).
104 Id. (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 127. Courts have since upheld FCC rules that
limit children's access to dial-a-porn by requiring, inter alia,
that customers request such service in writing before a common
carrier may provide access. Information Providers' Coalition for
Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.
1991).
10" United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James
Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
107 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978).
108 See id.
109 Id.
Commission's refusal to declare that a reading from
James Joyce's Ulysses over the airwaves would be
permissible because of its literary merit." 0 The re-
quest was made in May 1987, shortly after the FCC
had announced a new "get tough" approach to inde-
cency in which it cited three radio stations and one
amateur radio operator for violating the law."' One
of those stations, KPFK-FM in Los Angeles, was
owned by Pacifica Foundation, which had long been
known for its provocative programming (such as the
George Carlin monologue). Given its historic con-
nection to the FCC's indecency enforcement efforts,
Pacifica had reason to be concerned about its annual
"Bloomsday" reading from Ulysses on WBAI-FM
in New York.
Consequently, Pacifica sought guidance from the
FCC staff, asking for a declaratory ruling to clear
the long planned broadcast. Pacifica informed the
Commission that it intended to transmit a program
of "substantial literary and cultural value" at 11
p.m. on June 16, 1987. The request said that
Pacifica would precede the broadcast with appropri-
ate warnings, but that the program would contain
"salty" language." 2 Pacifica did not immediately
disclose that the quoted passages were from Ulysses,
although it revealed that fact in subsequent meetings
with FCC staff."'
The request presented the FCC with a dilemma.
If it permitted the broadcast, it might create a huge
loophole in the indecency policy. But if it did not, it
would suppress a classic of literature that courts had
freed from censorship in a landmark 1934 case." 4 In
short, the Commission's choice was to declare itself
to be either a eunuch or a laughingstock. Neither op-
tion being particularly attractive, the FCC forged a
third alternative - it declined to issue a ruling.1"
A letter from the FCC's Mass Media Bureau in-
formed Pacifica that "because of the first amendment
considerations that are involved, the Commission
must be especially cautious in exercising its authority
to issue declaratory rulings with respect to program
110 Letter from James C. McKinney, Chief, FCC Mass Me-
dia Bureau, to counsel for Pacifica (June 5, 1987)[hereinafter
Pacifica Complaint Reply].
M Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Pacifica Foundation,
FCC Ref. No. C5-574 (FCC, filed May 22, 1987).
112 Id.
11 For a full discussion of this case written by counsel for
Pacifica, see John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency
Redux: The Curious History of the New FCC Broadcast Inde-
cency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 329 (1989).
114 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James
Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
118 Pacifica Complaint Reply, supra note 110.
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content prior to broadcast." In support of this, the
Bureau quoted from the 1934 Ulysses case and
stated - falsely - that nothing in the proposed Bloom-
sday reading was similar to broadcasts recently
found by the FCC to be indecent. Accordingly, after
refusing to provide any further guidance, the FCC
instructed the licensee to rely on its own judgment as
to whether or not to transmit the program.
6
The Commission's deference to the good faith
judgment of the broadcast licensee served its institu-
tional purpose in permitting it to avoid making a de-
cision on the Pacifica petition for a declaratory rul-
ing. But the agency has otherwise shown little
inclination to trust those who must make risky pro-
gramming decisions. Just a few months after taking
a pass on the Ulysses request, the FCC ruled that
the question of indecency did not depend on the rea-
sonableness of the broadcaster's judgment.11 That is,
even if a broadcaster reasonably believed that a cer-
tain program had literary merit and could support
that belief with expert opinion, the FCC remained
the final arbiter of whether the program was inde-
cent. Where the government's aesthetic judgments
differed from that of the broadcaster, the licensee's
good faith belief was relevant only to the size of the
punishment.11
Broadcasters generally have shown great reluc-
tance to find out if their literary inclinations match
those of the bureaucrats. Despite a few notable ex-
ceptions, most steer a wide berth around the FCC's
rules. But the prospect that broadcasters are censor-
ing themselves finds few sympathetic ears among
those in government, notwithstanding any professed
concern for "first amendment considerations" in the
FCC's nonresponse to Pacifica.' In fact, the Com-
mission has stated that "to the extent a broadcaster is
"chilled" from airing indecent programs when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audi-
ence, that is not an 'inappropriate chill."'120 Of
course, this begs the central question: what is
indecent?
Apart from the circularity of the government's po-
sition and the disregard it exhibits for the constitu-
116 Id.
117 Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., Reconsideration Or-
der, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987)[hereinafter Infinity Order].
118 Id. at 933.
119 William J. Byrnes, 63 R.R.2d 216 (Mass Media Bureau
1987).
... Infinity Order, supra note 117, at n.45.
121 See, e.g., Stephen Farber, They Watch What We Watch,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 1989, at 42, 65; Marvin Kitman, The Best
Unwatched Show Ever, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 1988, at 15.
tional obligations of public servants, it utterly ig-
nores the problem of indecency law for programming
in which literary merit is the dispositive issue. It also
is the reason why you are unlikely to see many pro-
grams like The Singing Detective on American
broadcast TV.
The Singing Detective, a seven-hour Peabody
Award winning mini-series produced by BBC, has
been praised as one of the finest television programs
in history.1"' Critics were unanimous in calling the
production a masterpiece. Steven Bochco, who cre-
ated Hill Street Blues and NYPD Blue called it
"seven of the best hours I have ever seen on a televi-
sion set."" 2" Marvin Kitman of Newsday wrote that
The Singing Detective is "the most incredible TV
program ever made." He called it "the kind of pro-
gram that once in a generation or two comes along
and permanently changes the boundaries of TV. It
extends the parameters of what TV drama can do
and reclaims TV as a creative medium."' s Vincent
Canby of the New York Times said "it is better than
anything I've seen this year in the theatre (live or
dead). [It] set[s] a new standard for all films." 2"
John J. O'Connor, also of the Times, wrote that the
program "opened up the boundaries of TV drama,
making the special form as challenging and compel-
ling as the very best of film and theatre." ' 5 And
Charles Champlin of the LA Times called it "the
most potent and imaginative television I saw in all of
1988.12
6
The show was aired by various public television
stations between 1988 and 1990. On New Years
Day 1990, KQED in San Francisco presented The
Singing Detective in its entirety, starting at 11 a.m.
and ending at 6 p.m. One viewer complained to the
FCC, and he sent crude videotapes of the five min-
utes or so that he claimed were indecent. This trig-
gered an investigation that lasted more than a year
and led to discussions at the agency's highest levels.
Staff members of all five Commissioners watched the
tape, and then met to discuss the fate of KQED.
Dismissing the complaint should have been a sim-
ple matter. To the extent the FCC seriously consid-
"* Farber, supra note 121.
122 Kitman, supra note 121; Marvin Kitman, Riding Potter's
Express, NEWSDAY, Feb. 17, 1989.
1, Vincent Canby, Is the Year's Best Film on TV? N.Y.
TIMEs, July 10, 1988.
125 John J. O'Connor, TV View, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1988.




ered merit as an important factor in making inde-
cency determinations, The Singing Detective did not
present a close case. The critical acclaim, the
Peabody Award, and the serious content should eas-
ily have outweighed the few assertedly offensive mo-
ments in the seven-hour production. But the FCC
did not consider the program as a whole. Indeed, the
Commission did not even know what the show was
about. Its review was riveted on images of brief
nudity and a short scene in which a child witnesses a
non-graphic sexual encounter.
Unlike the Pacifica request regarding Ulysses, the
FCC could not point to a court decision that af-
firmed the program's literary value. Even with a ju-
dicial seal of approval, the Commission had declined
to rule on the decency or indecency of Ulysses. So in
the case of The Singing Detective, the agency was
paralyzed. The matter languished for months and fi-
nally was forgotten. No order was ever issued by the
FCC.
KQED spent this time in regulatory limbo as
well. It hired Washington counsel, and probably
spent thousands of dollars in defense of the program.
With other matters pending at the Commission, the
station could not afford the black mark of an inde-
cency fine. KQED ultimately was let off the hook,
but the long investigation served as an object lesson
for any stations with an interest in presenting
groundbreaking programming. The moral of the
story for station managers was, when in doubt leave
it out.
As this example suggests, indecency law estab-
lishes the FCC as a national censorship board.
Before the Supreme Court came to rely on local
community standards for obscenity determinations,
Justice Brennan complained that the Court had be-
come a "board of censorship for the 50 states."'
1 2 7
When the Court made such judgments, Justice
Brennan noted that "[o]ne cannot say with certainty
that material is obscene until at least five members of
this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards,
have pronounced it so.""' Yet that is precisely the
role now assigned to the five FCC Commissioners
with respect to indecency, even though such speech is
127 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92-93 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
128 Id.
12I Dan Balz & Thomas Edsall, Dole's Blast at Hollywood
Resonates, WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at Al.
120 Patrick Buchanan, A Conservative Makes a Final Plea,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 30, 1987, at 23, 26.
121 Id.
1"2 Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 113.
protected by the First Amendment.
Empowering a single federal agency with such au-
thority unquestionably raises constitutional danger
signals. This is particularly true where, as is the case
with the FCC, the agency's members are politically
appointed and may be susceptible to political
pressures.
Such pressures abound. In announcing his most
recent presidential bid, Senator Robert Dole attacked
Hollywood for undermining American values." 9
Former White House Director of Communications
Patrick Buchanan (recently a perennial presidential
contender), urged President Reagan in 1987 to get
more directly involved with the FCC and demand
that it "begin pulling the licenses of broadcasters
[who transmit] this garbage."'30 Such a move,
Buchanan argued, would reestablish Republican ties
to the religious right.'' In such an environment the
FCC can be subjected to political blackmail. For ex-
ample, efforts reportedly were made to deny reap-
pointment to former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler
because of charges that he failed to vigorously en-
force the indecency rules.'82
Such pressures are by no means confined to those
on the political right. In 1989 confirmation hearings
for FCC Chairman Al Sikes and Commissioners
Sherrie Marshall and Andrew Barrett, Democratic
senators led the charge on indecency. In particular,
Senators Daniel Inouye, Ernest Hollings, Jay Rock-
efeller and then-Senator Al Gore grilled the nomi-
nees for two hours, paying close attention to the
question of broadcast content.' Senator Gore,
whose wife Tipper had gained notoriety attacking
lewd rock lyrics,' 8 " was particularly concerned about
Barrett's statement that indecent broadcasts exist be-
cause "there is a market for indecency out there...
in America."' 8 Although Barrett's statement was
unquestionably true, both Senators Gore and Rocke-
feller voted against the nominations.' 6 Senator Hol-
lings, expressing his displeasure with the FCC's safe
harbor approach to indecency regulation, stated:
"Garbage is garbage, regardless of the time of
day.'
' 87
18 Congress Asserts Its Domination Over FCC, BROAD-
CASTING, Aug. 7, 1989, at 27 [hereinafter Congress Asserts).
184 See, e.g., Gore, Wife Backpedal Over Lyrics, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 5, 1987, at C5; Sen. Gore? Is He the One Married to
Tipper?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1987, at A24.
128 Congress Asserts, supra note 133.
186 See 135 CONG. REC. 10,384 (1989).
17 Congress Asserts, supra note 133.
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III. COMSTOCKERY IN CYBERSPACE
The Communications Decency Act applies such
sentiments (and pressures) to the Internet and online
services. As a result, it is extremely bad news for the
First Amendment. Nothing in the history of inde-
cency enforcement suggests that this law can be
made compatible with a culture of free expression.
Indecency rules are based on the central assumptions
of obscenity law as it existed under Anthony Coin-
stock's reign, when great works of literature were
suppressed routinely. Applying this body of law to
cyberspace is like unleashing a virus that could
transform the essential character of the internet.
But why is this so different from prior restrictions,
such as the limits on dial-a-porn? If Congress may
apply indecency rules to certain telephone transmis-
sions, why should it not also apply the same law to
computer communications that are transmitted by
telephone lines? After all, according to this line of
reasoning, communications media are licensed by the
government, bring communications into the home,
and are accessible to children. Advocates of this posi-
tion maintain that computer communications may
provide an even more compelling case for govern-
ment control because of the wide array of resources
that can be accessed over the Internet.
But this view fails to take into account the differ-
ing natures of the technologies involved and the in-
formation they provide, the difficulty of rational reg-
ulation and the constitutional risks involving the
government in a dynamic new medium. Compare
broadcasting and telephone communications, for ex-
ample. Radio and television stations transmit en-
tertainment and informational programs that may
touch on adult themes ranging from the satire of
Howard Stern, to brief nudity on NYPD Blue to
news reports on the photographs of Robert Map-
plethorpe.' 8' With telephone communications, the
indecency issue has been confined to the heavy
breathing of dial-a-porn." 9 No one has complained
about readings of Lady Chatterly's Lover by late
night-telephone operators. Phone sex may be a brisk
18 Robert Mapplethorpe was an accomplished and
respected photographer who died in April 1989 from AIDS.
Mapplethorpe was well known for both his celebrity photo-
graphs and his controversial and sexually explicit photographs
that created a furor in Congress over grants from the National
Endowment for the Arts. See Suzanne Mucnic, Mapplethorpe
Works Draw Top Dollar, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1989, at Fl;
Alan G. Artner, The Eye of the Storm: Mapplethorpe's
Unblinking Vision Sparked a Continuing Battle Over Art, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 31, 1989, at C4; Mapplethorpe Photos Ruled Not
Obscene, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at Al.
business, but a narrow range of informational con-
tent is involved.
Proponents of the Communications Decency Act
blithely applied indecency precedents across the vari-
ous technologies as if they were interchangeable. In
introducing S. 892,140 a bill similar to the Communi-
cations Decency Act, Senator Grassley simply as-
serted, quoting the Pacifica dictum describing radio,
that "computers [have] 'a uniquely pervasive pres-
ence in the lives of all Americans,"' are " 'uniquely
accessible to children,"' and "can be regulated to
protect children. 14' However, merely lifting phrases
from a Supreme Court case does not make them ap-
plicable to the technology in question. Unlike radio
and television, which are universally available to
American homes, less than seven percent of U.S.
households are on-line. " ' Additionally, only about
six percent of children between the ages of two and
eighteen have access to the Internet. "'
Judicial decisions regarding indecency regulation
of broadcast versus cable television make clear that
such rules cannot simply be transplanted from one
technology to another. For example, the most recent
D.C. Circuit opinion upholding a "safe harbor ap-
proach to regulating broadcast indecency emphasized
that its conclusion was predicated upon "the unique
context of the broadcast medium." The court stressed
that "traditional broadcast media are properly sub-
ject to more regulation than is generally permissible
under the First Amendment;" that "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children;" and that "prior
warnings cannot completely protect the listener or
viewer from unexpected program content." The
court made clear that broadcasting cannot be com-
pared to a situation in which a recipient "seeks and
is willing to pay for the communication.'
44
For this reason, courts have always treated cable
television differently than over-the-air broadcasting
under the indecency rules. Decisions have consist-
ently struck down indecency regulations directed at
cable programming because many of the program-
ming services are available by subscription and be-
cause parents have the option of using a "lock box"
18 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 115.
140 S. 892, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
141 CONG. REC. S7922 (June 7, 1995).
14 Elizabeth Corcoran, On-Line Rivals Appeal to
Microsoft, WASH. POST, July 20, 1995, at D11.
14 Timothy Noah, Cigarettes Are Being Marketed Through
Web Sites on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1996, at B2.
144 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,
660 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(quoting Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)).
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to preclude access to selected channels.1"5 Thus, the
Pacifica precedent for regulating broadcast indecency
does not support content control of cable television
- a strikingly similar technology."' Indeed, in June
the D.C. Circuit upheld a Cable Act provision that
empowers cable television operators to refuse to ac-
cept indecent programming on leased access chan-
nels. 47 In upholding the rule, however, the court
emphasized that if the government had sought to
regulate indecency on access channels directly, "the
Commission and the United States would be hard
put to defend the constitutionality of these
provisions. "148
The differences that separate constitutional from
unconstitutional regulation of indecency are particu-
larly relevant to online services, which have far more
in common with cable television than with broad-
casting. The Supreme Court has emphasized that in-
decency rules must be sufficiently narrow to achieve
their purpose without excessively limiting speech.14 9
After ten years of litigation over successive attempts
to write rules regarding dial-a-porn - the audio
equivalent of girlie magazines - the courts upheld
only very narrow restrictions on access by minors to
the service. 80 In the case of cable television, inde-
cency rules were struck down altogether.15 Mean-
while, the task has been far more complex with
broadcasting. Not only have the FCC and the courts
wrestled over setting a constitutionally-permissible
safe harbor, they also have struggled with trying to
apply the indecency standard to works of genuine
merit. 62 In this regard, the FCC's experience with
Ulysses and The Singing Detective does not inspire
confidence.
In the online context, the censorial effect of inde-
cency restrictions is magnified. This is true because
of the vast array of information available online, and
the multiple functions made possible through inter-
activity. By mid-1995, there were more than fifty to
15 See generally ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986); Cruz
v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Quincy Cable TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
", Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611
F. Supp. 1099 (D.C. Utah 1985), affd sub nom. Jones v. Wil-
kinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), afl'd mem. 480 U.S. 926
(1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Daniels
Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C.
1993); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp.
1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531
F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982). See generally Note, Content Reg-
ulation of Cable Television: Indecency Statutes and the First
Amendment, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 141
seventy-thousand computer bulletin board systems
("BBS") operating in the United States, some free
and others by subscription. Usenet, an international
collection of BBS newsgroups accessible by Internet,
covers almost any imaginable topic, from the Hubble
Telescope to the wit and wisdom of Jerry Lewis." 8
This growth was accompanied by the emergence of
online services such as America Online, Prodigy,
CompuServe, Delphi, GEnie and Apple Computers
e-World. These services, now with approximately
seven million subscribers, can variously be character-
ized as providing a bookstore, magazine stand, news
wire service, archive, message center, mail carrier,
gathering place and publishing house. The available
content and functionality of these services simply
cannot be compared to either dial-a-porn or broad-
cast programming. This not only complicates the
problem of evaluating merit, to put it mildly, it
makes even reviewing the myriad forms of informa-
tion nearly impossible.
Perhaps more importantly, the nature of online
communication also makes such intrusive regulations
far less necessary. Computers and modems offer
users a much greater degree of control over what
may be accessed than ever imagined for a telephone
or television. To begin with, computers require a ba-
sic skill literacy that is not a prerequisite for the
other communications appliances. Additionally,
software may be configured to screen-out unwanted
services. Online services such as Prodigy and
America Online already provide software tools that
allow parents to control their children's access. To
obtain access to Usenet newsgroups, Prodigy re-
quires activation by the household account holder
(who must have a credit card, and presumably is an
adult). Siecom, Inc., an Internet access provider that
serves elementary and secondary schools, restricts ac-
cess to questionable newsgroups and provides the op-
tion of scanning e-mail to screen objectionable mate-
(1985).
147 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105
(D.C. Cir. 1995)(en banc).
148 Id.
1 See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
1 0 See, e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 115.
181 See supra notes 147, 148 and accompanying text.
1 See S. Fork Broadcasting v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 304 U.S.
App. D.C. 126 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
158 See generally HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE IN-





Other software providers have developed services
to allow parents to block access to various Internet
resources, including the World Wide Web. For ex-
ample, SurfWatch blocks access to USENET new-
sgroups, the World Wide Web, gopher and FTP
sites, and automatically updates the list of blocked
Internet sites.' 55 Another service, Cyber Patrol
blocks access to locations on the Internet by key
word or by using a list of identified sites. Cyber Pa-
trol allows parents to screen out some or all of
twelve content categories.' 56
Both SurfWatch and Cyber Patrol use a commu-
nications standard developed by the World Wide
Web Consortium.157 The standard, called the Plat-
form for Internet Content Selection ("PICS"), de-
fines the method by which content ratings can be uti-
lized by screening software. The PICS standard
allows third party organizations (whether a nudist
society or the Christian Coalition) to rate on-line
content according to criteria employed by each or-
ganization. End users may select the screening pro-
gram designed by the organization with which they
feel the greatest affinity.
Rob Glaser, chief executive of Progressive Net-
works, said he envisioned just such a system. Per-
haps several dozen tunable filters can be developed
by "very credible" organizations that parents would
trust.' 58 Glaser cited the National Education Associ-
ation as an organization that parents might rely on
for a stamp of approval; other parents might prefer
the Christian Coalition, the Institute for Objectivist
Studies, or the Children's Defense Fund.'" 9
It has been suggested that "online systems give us
far more genuinely free speech and free press than
ever before in human history."'60 But not under the
regime of the Communications Decency Act. The
harsh penalties imposed, including possible jail
terms, ensure that those placed at risk will err on the
side of exclusion. At the very least, the law will force
content providers to restrict, or delete entirely any-
thing that is even questionable. This affects all users,
"6 Lewis, supra note 22.
166 ALA Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of
Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ACLU v. Reno,
Civil Action No. 96-963 (E.D.Pa.) at 21-22 (filed March 1,
1996).
150 Id. at 22.
16M The Consortium is an organization of computer scientists
and engineers who confer to agree on technical protocols to be
used with the Internet. Id. at 23 n.60.
' 5 Elizabeth Corcoran, 3 Firms Developing Anti-Smut
Software; 'Filters' to Screen Internet Material, WASH. POST,
not just children.
Consider the effect Communications Decency Act
will have on a program such as Project Gutenberg,
which makes electronic texts of books freely available
on the World Wide Web. Even a cursory examina-
tion of the books provided by this remarkable service
turns up authors, such as D.H. Lawrence, that are
likely to lead to trouble, just as they did under
Anthony Comstock. The only option under the law
may be for services like Project Gutenberg to screen
their materials and to sharply restrict access. Even if
such a thing could be accomplished, it defeats the
purpose of Project Gutenberg, which was created "to
make information, books and other materials availa-
ble to the general public in forms ...people can
easily read, use, quote, and search."' 1
Some discount the prospect that such an unques-
tionably meritorious venture as Project Gutenberg
could be at risk. After all, they say, the days of the
book burners are past. But they are wrong. Each
year the American Library Association and Ameri-
can Booksellers Association compile a list of attempts
to restrict access to books in libraries or bookstores in
the United States. In East Hampton, New York, for
example, the children's book Where's Waldo? was
banned because part of a tiny drawing shows a wo-
man lying on the beach wearing a bikini bottom but
no top.1' 2 The ALA's 1994 Banned Books Resource
Guide lists 800 titles that were challenged in 1993-
94."8 Similarly, People for the American Way docu-
mented 463 challenges to books during the same
school year.'" The new law simply moves this bat-
tleground online.
In addition to this chilling scenario, the legislation
contains some genuine loopiness. For example, per-
sons under eighteen retain the ability to send or
make available indecent messages to those over eigh-
teen, which could possibly lead to some bizarre re-
sults. In May, 1995, the New York Times reported
the story of a Bellevue, Washington high school hon-
ors student who was punished for putting a satirical
home page lampooning his school on the World
June 13, 1995, at Dl.
159 Id.
160 LANCE ROSE, NETLAW 4 (Berkeley: Osborne McGraw-
Hill, 1995).
101 http://jg.cso.uiuc.edu/pg.home.html.
'" Viva Hardigg, Censors at Work, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, Sept. 26, 1994, at 29.
1e" American Library Association Office of Intellectual Free-
dom, 1994 BANNED BOOKS RESOURCE GUIDE (1994).
104 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ATTACKS ON THE
FREEDOM TO LEARN (1994).
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Wide Web.165 The page contained hypertext links to
other Internet sites that offer sexually explicit mate-
rial.' Under the proposed law, the student would
have a valid defense from prosecution so long as he
employed FCC-approved procedures to restrict ac-
cess to his home page. He could even send some of
the material by e-mail to an adult, such as a favorite
teacher. But if he sent the same message to a class-
mate, he could wind up in the slammer for two
years. 
17
Finally, the law imposes a single national stan-
dard on digital transmissions, with the government
as the arbiter of decency. This might not be all bad,
according to some observers, because the law also
governs obscenity and a national standard could pos-
sibly prevent the most restrictive communities from
creating a lowest-common-denominator standard." 8
The potential for such a problem has been vividly
demonstrated by the conviction of a California
couple whose restricted, adults-only bulletin board
was accessed by a postal inspector in Tennessee. The
postal inspector, using an assumed name, paid a sub-
scription fee to join the bulletin board and
downloaded digital images of sexual activity that did
not violate the community standards of California.
But a jury in Tennessee found their sensibilities
were violated and voted to convict. 69 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit upheld the conviction, raising the pos-
sibility that Memphis Tennessee may define the
community standard for all of cyberspace. As impor-
tant as it is to correct this precedent, the Communi-
cations Decency Act is no solution.'7 Federal ob-
scenity laws are still enforced by local juries using
local standards, just as the Supreme Court decreed in
Miller v. California'71 and its progeny. The Com-
munications Decency Act does not change that fact.
But it purports to establish a national standard for
indecency, which is cold constitutional comfort given
the range of materials at risk.
There is often much complacency surrounding the
net, probably because of its anarchist origins and
spirit. John Gilmore has said that the Internet treats
16' Melanie J. Mavrides, Youths Parody on the Internet
Brings Punishment and Free Speech Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 1995, (Abstracts) at 18.
6 Id.
167 Telecomm Act, supra note 2, § 502.
1 ROSE, supra note 160, at 254-55.
169 United States v. Thomas, CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 13, 1994) (conviction and forfeiture order), appeals dock-
eted, No. 94-6648 and No. 94-6649 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1994).
.70 See Telecomm Act, supra note 2, § 509.
171 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
i"a John Gilmore is an internet pioneer. On a Screen Near
censorship as system damage and routes around it.'
Perhaps that is so. But censorship nevertheless
causes damage, and its weight is typically borne by
the individuals who are prosecuted or wind up in
endless FCC proceedings. There is a societal loss as
well, as everyone else becomes just a bit more cau-
tious about what they write, say or think. Esther
Dyson wrote that cyberspace still exists at the pleas-
ure of the real world." 8 Never has that been more
true.
Post Script
The Communications Decency Act was challenged
in court immediately after passage. The ACLU filed
suit the day the law was signed, and other litigants
quickly followed.174 The court granted a partial tem-
porary restraining order in ACLU v. Reno,17 and
put the litigation on a fast track.
As this article goes to press, no decision has yet
been issued in the cases challenging the Communica-
tions Decency Act. By the time it is published, a de-
cision will be issued at least with respect to requests
for a preliminary injunction. Ultimate appeal to the
Supreme Court will follow.
I predict that the Communications Decency Act
will be struck down. But if the history of indecency
regulation is any guide, such rules will rematerialize
in another form. The lessons of broadcast regulation
and dial-a-porn rules suggest that Congress will con-
tinue to pass measures to regulate sexually-oriented
speech until it finds a formulation that courts will
accept.
It is vitally important, therefore, that judicial deci-
sions apply the appropriate First Amendment test in
these initial cases. This means recognizing that the
Pacifica rationale is a limited exception to traditional
First Amendment doctrine. The courts also should
conclude that the full First Amendment protections
apply to new media unless there is some compelling
justification to apply some lesser standard. No such
showing has been made in the case of on-line com-
You, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38.
17M Esther Dyson is a publisher of a computer industry
newsletter "Release 1.0." John Mintz, Some Internet Users to
be Charged Fees: U.S. to Shift Costs of Services, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 1995, at D10.
17. See ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL 65464 (E.D.Pa.). Another
case, American Library Assoc. v. Department of Justice, Civil
Action No. 96-1458 (E.D.Pa.), was consolidated with the
ACLU case. Another challenge was filed in Shea v. Reno, 96
Civ. 0976 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
176 1996 WL 65464.
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munications. The individualized level of control that
is possible over computer communication undermines
any potential justification for more intrusive regula-
tion, and supports a finding that the greatest level of
constitutional protection should apply.
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